As the internet becomes the basic resource of information, not only texts but images retrieval systems have been appeared. However, many of those supply only a list of images, so we have to seek the expecting images one by one. Although, image labeling is one of the solutions of such a problem, various words are labeled to an image if the words are extracted from only one Web page. Therefore, this paper proposes an image clustering system that labels images by (...) words related to a search keyword. This relationships are measured by Web pages in WWW. By the experimental results, users were enabled to find the intended images more faster than the ordinal image search system. (shrink)

『日本唯物論史』などで知られるわが国の唯物論哲学の開拓者・永田廣志の生涯をまとめ、その理論活動の意義を解明。哲学研究者と在野の郷土史家との共同研究が生み出した成果。本邦初公開の貴重な資料や秘蔵写真も多 数紹介。.

Recently, philosophers with an interest in consciousness have turned their attention towards “fringe states of consciousness”. Examples include dreams, trances, and meditative states. Teetering between wakefulness and non-consciousness, fringe states illuminate the limits and boundaries of consciousness. This paper aims to give a coherent conceptualisation of deep meditative states, focussing in particular on phenomenal temporality during meditation. Advanced meditators overwhelmingly describe deep states of meditation as atemporal and timeless; however, they also report being continuously alert while meditating. I intend to (...) give a coherent interpretation of this apparent contradiction. After introducing some candidate interpretations, I shall argue that during (deepest) meditation, the subject experiences ‘pure duration’ without temporal structure. This, I argue, explains best why meditators describe deep meditation as ongoing but timeless awareness. A central part of the paper will expand on an account of phenomenal duration without phenomenal succession. The conclusion points towards some further avenues of research. (shrink)

Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (...) what exactly is an experience of temporal passage? One natural thought is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing change, or in virtue of experiencing change as ‘dynamic’. Another is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing events as (successively) present. None of these experiences, I argue, amounts to an experience of passage. Although there might still be other ways to experience passage, A-theorists would have to provide us with a plausible candidate experience. If there is such an experience at all, it won’t be one that qualifies as what we intuitively take to be an experience of passage. The ‘intuitive advantage’, it seems, has dissolved in any case. (shrink)

We report on the small-scale (0.5 13 h - 1M, a large-scale bias of ~2.0 and a satellite fraction of 12 ± 2 per cent. Thus, these galaxies occupy haloes with average masses in between those of the higher redshift BOSS CMASS sample and the original SDSS I/II luminous red galaxy sample © 2012 The Authors Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society © doi:10.1093/mnras/sts314.

Abstract- Presentism And Temporal Experience Intuitively, we all believe that we experience change and the passage of time. Presentism prides itself as the most intuitive theory of time. However, a closer look at how we would experience temporality if presentism was true reveals that this is far from obvious. For if presentism was really so intuitive, then it would do justice to these intuitions. In the course of this article I examine how presentism fares when combined with various leading theories (...) of perception and temporal perception. I focused on two Central Questions. Can presentism, given theory X, account for experiences of change and duration? And can presentism, given theory X, account for experiences of time as passing? I argue that there is no possible combination which allows for an experience of time as passing. This result alone undermines the alleged intuitive advantage of presentism and with it the motivation for the view. Presentism, it remains safe to say, is not as intuitive a theory as its adherents like to portray it. (shrink)

Is it the case that, in order to have a perceptual experience as of change, duration, or any other temporally extended occurrence at all, the duration of the experience itself must come apart from the apparent duration of what is experienced? I shall argue that such a view is at least coherent. The largest part of the paper will be concerned with an objection from Ian Phillips . The objection is interesting in so far as it is an argument from (...) introspection. If it worked, it would give us a priori, non-empirical grounds for thinking that a cluster of views about temporal perception are wrong, or worse, impossible. I will argue, however, that the objection fails. Towards the end, I briefly explore the view that we have no introspective access at all to the duration of our experiences. I suggest that such a view may well be supported by some considerations about the phenomenal continuity of consciousness. (shrink)

As children grow, they increasingly encounter situations requiring them to follow multiple steps to manipulate objects or perform actions. This study examines how caregivers adjust their instructional behavior when a child fails to correctly execute part of a multi-step procedure. Thirty-two mothers demonstrated to their 2–3-year-old children how to use a novel toy with three action sequences. A motion capture system measured the movements of each mother’s hand during demonstrations to assess whether mothers modulated their motions during each manipulation phase. (...) Analyses revealed that mothers changed their demonstrations depending on their children’s imitation task performance. Specifically, mothers shortened their demonstrations for the parts that the children could perform and emphasized their movements for the parts that the children could not perform. This study reveal that, unlike in previous studies, infant-directed actions may contain strategies that are more understandable to children depending on the purpose of the action. (shrink)

In the last few years, the molecular and genetic nature of the granulocyte colonystimulating factor, which controls proliferation and differentiation of neutrophils, has been characterized. Recent clinical application of G‐CSF proves that this hormone is effective in the treatment of patients suffering from neutropenia.

Rho, a member of the Ras superfamily of small GTPases, has multiple biological roles: it regulates signal trasduction pathways linking extracellular growth factors to the assembly of actin stress fibres and focal adhesion complexes; it is required for G1 progression and activates the SRF transcription factor when quiescent fibroblasts are stimulated to grow; and it plays a role later in the cell cycle during cytokinesis. Two groups have recently succeeded in identifying downstream effectors of Rho that may mediate some of (...) these biological effects. One protein identified by both groups is protein kinase N (PKN), a serine/threonine kinase whose catalytic domain is closely related to that of protein kinase C(1,2). (shrink)

The project of my dissertation was to advance the metaphysical debate about temporal passage, by relating it to debates about the perceptual experience of time and change. It seems true that we experience temporal passage, even if there is disagreement whether time actually passes, or what temporal passage consists in. This appears to give the defender of dynamic time an advantage in accounting for our experience. I challenge this by arguing that no major account of temporal perception can accommodate experiences (...) of temporal passage such that we could infer passage from them. This shows that static theories of time are at no disadvantage in accounting for the phenomenology of temporality. The conclusion has far reaching consequences: for instance, an important motivation for holding an A-theory of time is precisely the psychological intuition that we experience temporal passage. By undermining that intuition, I undermine the motivation for holding an A-theory. (shrink)

We develop a theory about the metaphysics of time and modality that combines the conceptual resources devised in recent sympathetic work on ontological pluralism (the thesis that there are fundamentally distinct kinds of being) with the thought that what is past, future, and merely possible is less real than what is present and actual (albeit real enough to serve as truthmakers for statements about the past, future, and merely possible). However, we also show that despite being a coherent, distinctive, and (...) prima facie appealing position, the theory succumbs to what we call the “problem of mixed ontological status”. We conclude that the proponents of the theory can only evade these problems by developing ontological pluralism in a radically different way than it has been by its recent sympathizers. (shrink)

When we cook, by meticulously following a recipe, or adding a personal twist to it, we sometimes care not only to (re-)produce a taste that we can enjoy, but also to give our food a certain aftertaste. This is not surprising, given that we ordinarily take aftertaste to be an important part of the gustatory experience as a whole, one which we seek out, and through which we evaluate what we eat and drink—at least in many cases. What is surprising (...) is that aftertastes, from a psychological point of view, seem to be analogous to afterimages, and thus have little or no epistemic import. In this paper we tackle this puzzle, and argue that we are right in treating aftertastes seriously. The moral is that both from a metaphysical and an epistemic point of view aftertastes should be categorized differently from afterimages. (shrink)

Long before the origins of agriculture human ancestors had expanded across the globe into an immense variety of environments, from Australian deserts to Siberian tundra. Survival in these environments did not principally depend on genetic adaptations, but instead on evolved learning strategies that permitted the assembly of locally adaptive behavioral repertoires. To develop hypotheses about these learning strategies, we have modeled the evolution of learning strategies to assess what conditions and constraints favor which kinds of strategies. To build on prior (...) work, we focus on clarifying how spatial variability, temporal variability, and the number of cultural traits influence the evolution of four types of strategies: (1) individual learning, (2) unbiased social learning, (3) payoff-biased social learning, and (4) conformist transmission. Using a combination of analytic and simulation methods, we show that spatial—but not temporal—variation strongly favors the emergence of conformist transmission. This effect intensifies when migration rates are relatively high and individual learning is costly. We also show that increasing the number of cultural traits above two favors the evolution of conformist transmission, which suggests that the assumption of only two traits in many models has been conservative. We close by discussing how (1) spatial variability represents only one way of introducing the low-level, nonadaptive phenotypic trait variation that so favors conformist transmission, the other obvious way being learning errors, and (2) our findings apply to the evolution of conformist transmission in social interactions. Throughout we emphasize how our models generate empirical predictions suitable for laboratory testing. (shrink)

The projection pattern of the existential/uniqueness presupposition of a wh-complement varies depending on the predicate that embeds it. This variation poses problems for existing accounts that treat the presupposition as a semantic contribution of an operator merging with the wh-complement or of the embedding predicate. I propose that the problems can be solved if the existential/uniqueness presupposition is contributed by the propositions corresponding to the answers of the embedded question, under the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics for questions.

Using an eighth-century copy of the 60-fascicle Flower Ornament Sutra as a case study, this article examines the transformation of a Buddhist scripture into an aesthetic object in early modern Japan. On the 14th day of the second month, 1667, a fire decimated Nigatsudo at Todaiji (Nara prefecture) along with most of the sacred objects within. Clerics salvaged partially burnt scrolls of an eighth-century Flower Ornament Sutra done in silver ink on indigo-dyed paper. The scrolls were restored ten years later, (...) but by the first half of the eighteenth century, part of the set left the temple and began circulating in the art market as collectable calligraphy fragments, later known as the “Nigatsudo burnt sutra” (Nigatsudo yakegyo). This study traces the curious shift in the attribution of Nigatsudo yakegyo’s calligrapher that took place in the eighteenth century to consider how the burn marks impacted the transformation of this scripture from a devotional text into a collectable artefact. I argue that the curious switch in attribution occurred adhering to the popular imagination of the calligraphers, as well as the distinct role certain fragments played within the early-modern calligraphy collecting culture. (shrink)

Shweder et al. (1997) proposed the three domains of morality: Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. This study used situation sampling to explore how people from Japan and the U.S. interpret moral transgressions provided in their own and another cultural context. Specifically, the analysis tested whether participants with one cultural background recognize culturally congruent moral transgressions as violations more frequently and feel more harshly towards them than culturally incongruent domains. Furthermore, the extent of evocation caused by the home and another culture was (...) investigated. This study asked 102 Japanese and 168 U.S. participants to judge which domain would be primarily involved in each transgression and to rate their wrongness. Participants showed a higher perceived magnitude of transgressions in culturally valued domains provided by in-group than outside members. Cross-cultural differences in morality and future directions are discussed. (shrink)

In studies publishing identifying personal information, obtaining consent is regarded as necessary, as it is impossible to ensure complete anonymity. However, current journal practices around specific points to consider when obtaining consent, the contents of consent forms and how consent forms are managed have not yet been fully examined. This study was conducted to identify potential issues surrounding consent to publish identifying personal information.

How are we aware of time? How do we perceive change and duration? What is it like to experience temporality as opposed to spatiality? Does the way we experience time tell us anything about the nature of time? This chapter focusses on some of the most pertinent questions in the philosophy of time—on the relation between subjective and objective time, on the metaphysical and psychological priority of the present, on the phenomenal difference between our experiences of space and our experiences (...) of time, and on how to reconcile relativistic time concepts with our common-sense ideas. It gives us an interesting in sight into leading debates on the topic, largely within the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophical traditions. This article intends to complement the chapter by providing a brief overview over views and debates about time consciousness in contemporary analytic philosophy. (shrink)

To ‘find one’s true self’ or to ‘reveal one’s true self’ are common enough expressions. But what do we really mean by the ‘true self’? Does it play an important explanatory role in understanding ourselves? The aim of this article is to shed light on the intuition that people have a true self—in contrast to their more readily perceptible “everyday self”—and to see whether we can give a clear philosophical account of it. When it comes to characterizing the true self (...) on the basis of these, I argue, our intuitions point us in two directions. The first suggests that the true self expresses a person’s essential nature. The second focuses on our own role in creating and maintaining a true self. I argue that both suggestions fail. Although the idea of a true self does not lack intuitive appeal, it is neither conducive to a convincing account, nor does it advance a theoretical understanding of ourselves as persons. (shrink)

To ‘find one’s true self’ or to ‘reveal one’s true self’ are common enough expressions. But what do we really mean by the ‘true self’? Does it play an important explanatory role in understanding ourselves? The aim of this article is to shed light on the intuition that people have a true self—in contrast to their more readily perceptible “everyday self”—and to see whether we can give a clear philosophical account of it. When it comes to characterizing the true self (...) on the basis of these, I argue, our intuitions point us in two directions. The first suggests that the true self expresses a person’s essential nature. The second focuses on our own role in creating and maintaining a true self. I argue that both suggestions fail. Although the idea of a true self does not lack intuitive appeal, it is neither conducive to a convincing account, nor does it advance a theoretical understanding of ourselves as persons. (shrink)

This book is a major early work of Japanese philosopher Wataru Hiromatsu (1933-1994). Originally published in 1972, the primary theme is overcoming the subject-object schema of modern philosophy. Hiromatsu seeks to replace this subject-object schema with what he calls the intersubjective fourfold structure, in which "the given is valid as something more to someone as someone more." This fourfold structure is not a sum of four independent elements, but exists only as a functional relationship. From this relationist point of (...) view, Hiromatsu develops his philosophical theory as a systematic critique of "reification," defined as the hypostatizing misconception of a functional relation. (shrink)

「脳死は人の死」のごまかし、がんでなくても人は死ぬ、「少年A」を解釈するな、埴谷雄高と大森荘蔵など、「魂」(プシューケー)の文体で考える純粋思惟の広大な視界。.

This study investigates Japanese compliments produced at a distinct sequential position and how the complimentees treat the compliments. In ordinary conversation, speakers sometimes talk about their accomplishments. Drawing on Conversation Analysis and multimodal interaction analysis, the study demonstrates how telling recipients deploy compliments at the possible completion of such tellings of accomplishment. The analysis also shows how the tellers deal with the complimentary telling responses, taking into consideration the design of tellings and the possibility of engaging in self-praise. The study (...) illuminates a context-sensitive nature of complimenting activity and managing two conflicting preferences by illustrating a specific interactional pattern of compliment sequences in Japanese ordinary conversation. (shrink)